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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
REYNALDO GONZALEZ, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  16-cv-03282-DMR    
 
 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Re: Dkt. No. 100 
 
This case arises from the tragic death of Nohemi Gonzalez, who was murdered during the 
November 2015 attacks in Paris committed by terrorists associated with the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (“ISIS”).  Plaintiffs are Gonzalez’s surviving family members, including her mother, 
father, stepfather, and brothers.  They seek to hold Defendant Google, Inc. (“Google”) liable for 
her death under the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, based on Google’s ownership 
and operation of YouTube.  Plaintiffs contend that Google has knowingly provided material 
support to ISIS in the form of its YouTube platform, and that ISIS has used YouTube as a tool to 
commit terrorism.  According to Plaintiffs, Google’s material support was a proximate cause of 
Gonzalez’s death. 
Google moves to dismiss the second amended complaint (“SAC”), primarily arguing that 
all of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(1), which protects online service providers from liability for material posted on a 
provider’s website by others.  The court held a hearing on July 27, 2017.  For the following 
reasons, Google’s motion is granted.  The SAC is dismissed with leave to amend. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs make the following allegations in the SAC, all of which are taken as true for 
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purposes of this motion.
1
  In the fall of 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez was a 26-year old California State 
University student studying abroad in Paris, France.  [Docket No. 95 (SAC) ¶ 408.]  On November 
13, 2015, Gonzalez was dining with a group of friends at La Belle Équipe, a Paris bistro.  A few 
minutes into their meal, three ISIS terrorists, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Brahim Abdeslam, and 
Chakib Akrouh, approached the restaurant and began spraying the patrons with bullets, killing 
Gonzalez and 18 others.  Id. at ¶¶ 412-414.  Two other groups of ISIS terrorists mounted 
coordinated attacks that night at other locations in Paris, including the Stade de France and the 
Bataclan Theatre concert hall.  They eventually killed 130 individuals and wounded nearly 400.  
Id. at ¶¶ 342-370.  ISIS issued statements claiming responsibility for the attacks, including audio 
and video messages posted on YouTube, a free online video platform owned and operated by 
Google.  Id. at ¶¶ 131, 138, 373-378, 382-390.  Plaintiffs allege that twelve individual ISIS 
terrorists were directly involved in the Paris attacks, including the three La Belle Équipe shooters.  
Id. at ¶ 247. 
The SAC describes in detail the origins of ISIS, which is a designated foreign terrorist 
organization (“FTO”) under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189.  Id. at ¶¶ 60-
127.  Plaintiffs allege that YouTube “has played an essential role in the rise of ISIS to become the 
most feared terrorist organization in the world.”  Id. at ¶ 139.  YouTube provides ISIS with a 
“unique and powerful tool of communication” that enables it to achieve its program of terrorism 
and motivate others to carry out more terrorist attacks.  Id. at ¶¶ 140-146.  Plaintiffs contend that 
ISIS uses YouTube as a means to accomplish many of its goals:   
 
ISIS not only uses YouTube for recruiting, planning, inciting, and 
giving instructions for terror attacks, ISIS also uses YouTube to 
issue terroristic threats, attract attention to its terror attacks and 
atrocities, instill and intensify fear from terror attacks, intimidate 
and coerce civilian populations, take credit for terror attacks, 
communicate its desired messages about the terror attacks, reach its 
desired audiences, demand and attempt to obtain results from the 
terror attacks, and influence and affect government policies and 
conduct.  
                                                 
1
 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 
(per curiam) (citation omitted). 
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Id. at ¶ 148.  Plaintiffs describe a number of videos that allegedly were posted on YouTube at the 
direction of individuals affiliated with ISIS, including gruesome depictions of executions of ISIS 
prisoners.  See id. at ¶¶ 104-105, 120, 172, 175, 188, 190-92, 205-226, 274-279, 296-298, 306-
309.   According to Plaintiffs, ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 foreign volunteers since 2014 
through its use of YouTube and other social media platforms.  Id. at ¶ 193.   
The SAC details the planning and execution of the Paris attacks.  Id. at ¶¶ 240-372.  
Plaintiffs allege that “a major component of the Paris Attack was the messaging disseminated by 
ISIS prior to, during, and after the events,” and that the planning for the attacks “involved the use 
of YouTube, before and after the attack, to intensify the fear and intimidation that ISIS intended to 
inflict by this mass casualty attack.”  Id. at ¶¶ 242-244.  According to Plaintiffs, ISIS used 
YouTube’s platform and services to “facilitate and accomplish” the goals of the attacks—
intimidation, coercion, and influence.  Id. at ¶¶ 241, 244.  Of the twelve ISIS terrorists who carried 
out the attacks, Plaintiffs allege that two, Abaaoud and Najim Laachraoui, used online social 
media platforms to post alleged terrorist recruiting videos.  Id. at ¶¶ 247, 296, 302.  Specifically, 
Plaintiffs allege that in March 2014, Abaaoud “posted a link on his Facebook account to an ISIS 
recruiting video on YouTube,” and that Laachraoui “actively followed ISIS social media accounts 
and posted links to jihadi YouTube videos on his own accounts as well.”  Id. at ¶¶ 296-298, 302.   
The SAC also contains allegations about the operation of the YouTube platform.  
Registered users may establish a YouTube “channel,” post videos on the platform, and post 
comments on the pages of YouTube channels and videos.  Id. at ¶ 134.  When a YouTube user 
posts a video, “Google’s computer servers receive the information and distribute it to the YouTube 
user’s network of YouTube channel ‘subscribers.’”  Id. at ¶ 464.  Google employs algorithms to 
help users locate other videos and accounts with similarities, “introducing users to other users and 
videos that they will be interested in based on the video and account information and 
characteristics.”  Id. at ¶¶ 470-471.  “[I]n this way, users are able to locate other videos and 
accounts related to ISIS even if they do not know the correct identifier or if the original YouTube 
account has been replaced by a new identifier.”  Id. at ¶ 470. 
Plaintiffs further allege that Google derives revenue from ads on YouTube.  According to 
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Plaintiffs, Google targets ads to the viewer “based upon algorithms that analyze and use data about 
the ads, the user, and the video posted.  Id. at ¶¶ 448-449.  Google “agrees to share[] a percentage 
of the revenue it generates from ads placed before YouTube videos with the user who posts the 
video.”  Id. at ¶ 452.  Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that “Google has reviewed and 
approved ISIS videos, including videos posted by ISIS-affiliated users, for ‘monetization’ 
through” its placement of ads with these videos.  By approving such videos, “Google has agreed to 
share with ISIS and ISIS-affiliated users a percentage of revenues generated by these ads.”  Id. at 
¶¶ 456-457.  The SAC includes a screen shot of an example of Google-placed targeted ads 
alongside what Plaintiffs describe as “an ISIS video” on YouTube.  Id. at ¶ 458. 
Plaintiffs allege that Google is a “content creator.”  While admitting that Google does not 
make the videos that are posted on YouTube, Plaintiffs allege that Google creates “new unique 
content” for viewers “by choosing which advertisement to combine with the posted video with 
knowledge about the viewer.”  Id. at ¶ 461.  In that way, “Google is not simply passing along 
content created by third parties”; instead, “Google incorporates ISIS posted videos along with 
advertisements matched to the viewer to create new content for which Google earns revenue.”  Id. 
at ¶ 462.  
Plaintiffs allege that Google has the ability to deny its YouTube-related services to ISIS, 
but refuses to do so.  Although Google has suspended or blocked certain ISIS-related accounts at 
various times, prior to the Paris attacks, Google did not make “substantial or sustained efforts to 
ensure that ISIS would not re-establish the accounts using new identifiers.”  Id. at ¶ 429.  Even 
though Google has tools to identify, flag, review, and remove ISIS YouTube accounts, it allows 
the accounts of “those who run afoul of its policies . . . to be quickly regenerated.”  Id. at ¶  475. 
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs contend that Google violated federal prohibitions by 
providing material support or resources for acts of international terrorism.  They bring four claims 
for relief under the ATA’s civil remedy provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d).  Section 2333(a) 
provides for a private right of action for damages sustained in an act of international terrorism:   
 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, 
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
Case 4:16-cv-03282-DMR   Document 110   Filed 10/23/17   Page 4 of 27
 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover 
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  Section 2333(d) provides that liability attaches to those who aid or abet an 
act of international terrorism by knowingly providing substantial assistance:   
 
 
In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of 
international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an 
organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist 
organization . . .  liability may be asserted as to any person who aids 
and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who 
conspires with the person who committed such an act of 
international terrorism. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d). 
Plaintiffs’ first and second claims for relief assert that Google is liable for aiding and 
abetting acts of international terrorism under section 2333(d) because it is “knowingly provid[ing] 
substantial assistance and encouragement to ISIS” and “conspiring with ISIS.”  FAC ¶¶ 485, 490-
491.  The third claim for relief asserts that Google is liable under section 2333(a) for providing 
ISIS with “material support and resources” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, a federal criminal 
statute which prohibits the provision of “material support or resources” to terrorists in the form of 
services, equipment, and personnel.  Id. at ¶¶ 493-497.  The fourth claim asserts that Google is 
liable under section 2333(a) based on its violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), which criminalizes 
the knowing provision of “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”  
Plaintiffs contend that Google violates section 2339B(a)(1) by “providing the YouTube platform 
and other services for ISIS’s benefit.  Id. at ¶¶ 500-504. 
Google moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), bars any claim that seeks 
to hold an online service provider liable for injuries allegedly resulting from its hosting of third-
party material.  It also argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are insufficiently pleaded.   
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 
the complaint.  See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).  
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When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 
(per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal 
theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to 
relief.”  Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 
2001).  A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).  In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than 
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 
(1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by 
Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Google argues that section 230(c)(1) of the CDA “immunizes providers of interactive 
computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties,” and thereby bars 
all of Plaintiffs’ claims.  See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  In response, Plaintiffs argue that section 
230(c)(1) does not apply in this case because it was abrogated by the recently enacted Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016).  
Plaintiffs also contend that section 230(c)(1) immunity does not attach here, because the statute 
cannot apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  Finally, Plaintiffs assert that 
even if section 230(c)(1) applies, it does not provide Google with immunity on these facts.  The 
court will begin with an overview of section 230(c)(1) before turning to the parties’ arguments. 
A. Background of Section 230(c)(1) 
Section 230(c), titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material,” provides two types of protection from civil liability.  Only the first is relevant 
here.  Section 230(c)(1) mandates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
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shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).2  Accordingly, section 230(c)(1) “precludes liability that 
treats a website as the publisher or speaker of information users provide on the website.”  Doe v. 
Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016).  “In general, this section protects 
websites from liability for material posted on the website by someone else.”  Id.  Section 230(c)(1) 
“overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under statutory and 
common law.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).  “As a matter of policy, 
‘Congress decided not to treat providers of interactive computer services like other information 
providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio stations, all of which may be held 
liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written or prepared by 
others.’”  Id. at 1026 (quoting Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998)).  In the 
absence of the protection afforded by section 230(c)(1), one who published or distributed speech 
online “could be held liable for defamation even if he or she was not the author of the defamatory 
text, and . . . at least with regard to publishers, even if unaware of the statement.”  Id. at 1026-27.   
The Ninth Circuit has held that the CDA “does not declare ‘a general immunity from 
liability deriving from third-party content.’”  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (quoting Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009)).  Nor was it “meant to create a lawless no-
man’s land on the Internet.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164.  Rather, “section 230(c)(1) protects 
                                                 
2
 The second immunity provision, section 230(c)(2), states: 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of— 
 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or 
 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means 
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). . . . 
 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
 
Case 4:16-cv-03282-DMR   Document 110   Filed 10/23/17   Page 7 of 27
 8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
from liability only (a) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (b) that the plaintiff 
seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information provided by another information content 
provider.”  Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1100-01).   
B. JASTA 
Plaintiffs argue that JASTA repealed the immunity provisions of the CDA, rendering 
section 230(c)(1) inapplicable in this case.  Congress enacted JASTA in September 2016.  JASTA 
expanded the ATA by adding 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d), which provides that US nationals may assert 
liability against a person who aids and abets or conspires with a person who commits an act of 
international terrorism.  JASTA also amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, to add a terrorism-related exception to the FSIA’s grant of immunity to 
foreign states.  
JASTA includes the following statement of purpose:  
 
The purpose of this Act is to provide civil litigants with the broadest 
possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, 
to seek relief against persons, entities, and foreign countries, 
wherever acting and wherever they may be found, that have 
provided material support, directly or indirectly, to foreign 
organizations or persons that engage in terrorist activities against the 
United States. 
JASTA § 2(b).  According to Plaintiffs, JASTA is “a game-changer” that “nullifies” Google’s 
motion, as it is a “much more recent expression of Congressional intent” than section 230(c)(1), 
which was enacted in 1996 and last amended in 1998.  Opp’n 3-4.  Plaintiffs argue that in light of 
Congress’s expressed intent to provide justice to victims of international terrorism, JASTA 
repealed the protections provided by section 230(c)(1).  Id. at 5. 
Plaintiffs do not clearly state their theory of repeal.  There are two kinds of statutory 
repeal, express and implied.  “[A]n express repeal requires that Congress overtly state with 
specificity that the subsequent statute repeals a portion of the earlier statute.”  Patten v. United 
States, 116 F.3d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d 286, 
290 (6th Cir. 1992)).  Here, since JASTA does not specifically refer to section 230, it did not 
expressly repeal the protections set forth in the relevant portions of the CDA.  See Moyle v. Dir., 
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Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 147 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (express repeal 
requires “reasonably certain identification of [the] affected act” (citation omitted)).   
Although not clearly articulated by Plaintiffs, the court assumes that Plaintiffs’ theory is 
that JASTA impliedly repealed section 230(c)(1).  “It is a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction that repeals by implication are not favored.”  United States v. $493,850.00 in U.S. 
Currency, 518 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting City & Cty. of S.F. v. Assessment Appeals 
Bd., 122 F.3d 1274, 1276 (9th Cir. 1997)).  “An implied repeal will only be found where 
provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole 
subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’”  Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 
273 (2003) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)); see also Radzanower 
v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict” when 
there is a “positive repugnancy between them or . . . they cannot mutually coexist.”).  “[I]n either 
case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.”  Radzanower, 426 U.S. 
at 154 (quoting Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503).   
The second type of implied repeal is not at issue here, as JASTA did not cover the entire 
subject of the relevant portion of the CDA, which provides “[p]rotection for private blocking and 
screening of offensive material” that exists online.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230.  Accordingly, the court 
assumes that Plaintiffs’ argument rests on a purported “irreconcilable conflict” between JASTA 
and the CDA.  Courts analyzing whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between two statutes 
examine the language of the statutes as well as relevant legislative history.  For example, in Moyle, 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a Social Security Act (“SSA”) garnishment provision 
impliedly repealed an anti-alienation provision of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) that Congress had enacted 48 years earlier.  147 F.3d at 1118-19.  
The court found that the two provisions were in irreconcilable conflict, because while the 
LHWCA anti-alienation provision, 33 U.S.C. § 916, prohibits garnishment of LHWCA benefits, 
the SSA garnishment provision permits garnishment of “moneys (the entitlement to which is based 
upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States . . . to any 
individual.”  The SSA provision also defined “remuneration for employment” to include 
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“worker’s compensation benefits paid or payable under Federal or State law.”  Id. at 1120, 1121 
(emphasis removed) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 659(a), (h)).  The court examined the plain language of 
the SSA provision and its legislative history, which included a statement that the SSA provision 
“applies to ‘payments under . . . the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (but 
only in cases where the payments are made by the United States).”  Id. at 1121 (emphasis in 
original) (quotation omitted).  It concluded that both the plain language and the legislative history 
of the statute “demonstrate[d] the legislature’s ‘clear and manifest’ intent to repeal the LHWCA 
Anti-Alienation provision when it enacted the SSA Garnishment provision.”  Id. at 1124.     
Here, Plaintiffs do not specifically identify any irreconcilable conflict between JASTA and 
the CDA in their opposition.  See Opp’n 4, 17.  Instead, they argue that JASTA’s express 
statement of purpose is “to provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, consistent with 
the Constitution of the United States,” to seek relief against those who provide material support to 
terrorists.  Plaintiffs contend that this language conveys Congress’s “clear expression that any 
other limitation on the Antiterrorism Act . . . is abrogated,” including every possible statutory 
immunity.  [Docket No. 105 (July 27, 2017 Hr’g Tr.) 8-9.]  According to Plaintiffs, Congress 
could have stated its intention that civil ATA claims should be given the “broadest possible” 
application “consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” but did not.  Per 
Plaintiffs, this should be interpreted to mean that any existing immunity law, short of what may be 
in the Constitution itself, cannot bar an ATA claim.  Opp’n 4 (emphasis in original); see also Hr’g 
Tr. 9.  Plaintiffs’ indirect repeal argument rests solely on the phrase “consistent with the 
Constitution of the United States” contained in JASTA’s statement of purpose.  They do not offer 
any legislative history or other support for their sweeping argument that JASTA expresses 
Congress’s intent to abrogate all statutory immunities for ATA claims, including section 230. 
Plaintiffs’ argument is not well taken.  JASTA does not reference any portion of the CDA 
either directly or indirectly, nor does it address the responsibilities of or protections for interactive 
computer service providers.  JASTA thus evinces no “clear and manifest” congressional intent to 
repeal any part of the CDA.  In contrast, JASTA expressly amended the FSIA to modify the 
immunity provision of that particular statute.  FSIA provides, “with specified exceptions, that a 
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‘foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States.’”  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 
1312, 1316 (2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604).  JASTA modified the FSIA to add 28 U.S.C. § 
1605B, which allows claims for damages against foreign states in any case “in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death occurring in the United 
States” caused by “the tortious act or omission of that foreign state” on U.S. soil.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1605B(b); JASTA § 3(a) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1605B, “Responsibility of foreign states for 
international terrorism against the United States”).  Under this provision, victims of terrorism in 
the United States can bring claims against foreign states regardless of whether they were 
designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism” at the time of the terrorist act.  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 
1605B(b) with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (requiring that foreign state have been designated 
as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the act “or was so designated as a result of such act”).  
This demonstrates that where Congress intended JASTA to repeal existing statutory immunities, it 
made that clear.   
Plaintiffs did not provide an analysis of JASTA’s legislative history, and the court’s own 
review did not reveal any support for Plaintiffs’ far-reaching interpretation.  The legislative history 
contains no evidence that Congress contemplated that JASTA would abrogate any statutory 
immunities other the immunity afforded by the FSIA.  Instead, JASTA’s history, including 
statements by members of Congress, reflects Congress’s clear intent to provide an exception to the 
FSIA’s presumptive immunity for foreign states in order “to hold foreign sponsors of terrorism 
that target the United States accountable in Federal courts.”  See 160 Cong. Rec. S6657-01, 2014 
WL 7001951, at *S6659 (Dec. 11, 2014).  As JASTA co-sponsoring Senators Charles Schumer 
and John Cornyn explained, the purpose of JASTA was to close a “loophole” in the FSIA that 
resulted in the dismissal of claims by the family members of the victims of the September 11, 
2001 attacks in New York against foreign entities that allegedly funded the attacks.  See id.; see 
also 162 Cong. Rec. S2845-01, 2016 WL 2888818, at *S2845 (May 17, 2016) (explaining 
legislation would enable “Americans and their family members who lost loved ones on 
[September 11, 2011] to pursue their claims for justice against those who sponsored those acts of 
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terrorism on U.S. homeland.”).  The discussion of the provision of JASTA that amended the ATA 
was fairly limited, and nothing in the legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress 
sought to eliminate all forms of statutory immunity in terrorism-related cases.
3
  
It is also worth noting that Plaintiffs’ argument relies not on the substantive provisions of 
JASTA, but on uncodified language setting forth its statement of purpose.  See JASTA § 2(b).  It 
is well settled that prefatory clauses or statements of purpose do not change the plain meaning of 
an operative clause.  See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016) 
(citing Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, 188 (1889)); see also Hawaii v. Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 173-76 (2009) (holding that preambular “whereas” clauses did 
not create substantive rights, and emphasizing that “repeals by implication are not favored and will 
not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.”).  In short, 
JASTA’s statement of purpose “cannot bear the weight” that Plaintiffs place on it.  See Hawaii, 
556 U.S. at 175. 
The court concludes that JASTA did not repeal section 230(c)(1). 
C. Extraterritorial Application of Section 230(c)(1) 
Plaintiffs also argue that section 230(c)(1) immunity does not arise because the CDA does 
not apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  According to Plaintiffs, Google 
provided support and resources to ISIS outside the United States, in Europe and the Middle East; 
ISIS’s use of Google’s resources was outside the United States; and the Paris attacks and 
Gonzalez’s death took place outside the United States.  Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, Google may 
not rely on section 230(c)(1).  Opp’n 19. 
The “presumption against extraterritoriality” of United States law mandates that “[a]bsent 
clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only 
domestic application.”  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (citing 
                                                 
3
 For example, Representative Chris Smith described the provision of JASTA that amended the 
ATA as “open[ing] foreign officials to accountability to so-called secondary liability, such as 
aiding and abetting or conspiring with terrorist perpetrators.”  162 Cong. Rec. H5239-03, 2016 
WL 4718240, at *H5244 (Sept. 9, 2016) (emphasis added).   
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Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).  Courts must use a “two-step 
framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.”  Id. at 2101.  First, the court must determine 
“whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute 
gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”  Id.  “If the statute is not 
extraterritorial, then at the second step [courts] determine whether the case involves a domestic 
application of the statute . . . by looking to the statute’s ‘focus,’” id., defined as the “objects of the 
statute’s solicitude.”  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.  “If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus 
occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if 
other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign 
country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other 
conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.”  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
At step one, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that the CDA does not contain “a clear, 
affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”  Id.  Therefore, the court must determine at 
step two whether this case involves a domestic application of the CDA.  To do so, the court must 
determine whether the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States or 
abroad.  Id.   
The court in Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., ---F. Supp. 3d---, Nos. 16-CV-4453 (NGG) (LB), 
16-CV-5158 (NGG) (LB), 2017 WL 2192621, at *13-15 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017), recently 
examined the exact question presented here, that is, whether section 230(c)(1) can be applied to 
conduct occurring outside of the United States.  Cohen examined the statute under the RJR 
Nabisco/Morrison framework.  Considering the text and context of section 230(c)(1), it 
determined that the focus of section 230(c)(1)’s solicitude is “its limitation on liability.”  Id. at 
*14.  The Cohen court noted that “[s]ection 230(c)(1) offers only one directive—that qualifying 
defendants may not be treated as the ‘publisher or speaker of any’ third party content—which it 
does not cabin based on either the location of the content provider or the user or provider of the 
interactive computer service.”  Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).  Applying relevant Second 
Circuit law, Cohen then assessed the “relevant territorial events and relationships that bear on that 
focus,” considering whether those events and relationships “occurred domestically or abroad with 
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respect to the challenged application of the statute.”  Id. at *13 (quoting Matter of a Warrant to 
Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 
216 (2d Cir. 2016)).  Cohen concluded that in light of section 230(c)(1)’s focus on limiting civil 
liability, “the relevant location is that where the grant of immunity is applied, i.e. the situs of the 
litigation.”  Id. at *15.  Specifically, the court found that “[g]iven the statutory focus on limiting 
liability, . . .  the location of the relevant ‘territorial events’ or ‘relationships’ cannot be the place 
in which the claims arise but instead must be where redress is sought and immunity is needed,” 
i.e., in the United States.  Id.   
The court agrees with Cohen that the focus of section 230(c)(1) is “limiting civil liability.”  
See id. at *15.
4
  In enacting section 230, Congress “chose[] to treat cyberspace differently” from 
information providers such as newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations, “all of 
which may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written or 
prepared by others.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026-27 (quotation omitted).  Congress made this choice 
for two primary reasons: “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech 
on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce,” and “to encourage interactive 
computer services and users of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other 
offensive material, so as to aid parents in limiting their children’s access to such material.”  Id. at 
1027-28; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (“[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services 
have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.”).  To 
                                                 
4
 At oral argument, Plaintiffs for the first time argued that in determining the statute’s focus for 
purposes of the two-step extraterritorial inquiry, the court must look at the entire statute, and not 
just the subsection at issue here.  According to Plaintiffs, the focus of the entire CDA is 
“regulation of speech” on the internet, and the immunity provided in section 230(c)(1) is merely 
“tangential[].”  [Docket No. 105 (Hr’g Tr.) 27.]  However, Plaintiffs did not brief this argument in 
their opposition.  That alone is reason to ignore it.  Moreover, the basis for their position is 
unclear.  Congress enacted the CDA as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Pub. L. 
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996).  The CDA included multiple anti-indecency and anti-
obscenity provisions or amendments to existing law, including criminal prohibitions against “the 
knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age” and 
“the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to 
a person under 18 years of age.”  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859-860 (1997) (discussing 47 
U.S.C. §§ 223(a), (d)).  In asserting that the court must “look at the whole statute,” (Hr’g Tr. 27), 
Plaintiffs did not explain whether they are referring to the entire CDA as enacted in 1996, 
including its criminal provisions, or to anything else.  The court is not obligated to entertain an 
unbriefed argument, nor is it inclined to try to figure out what Plaintiffs are arguing.   
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those ends, the only substantive provisions of section 230 are section 230(c), which gives 
providers and users of interactive computer services two types of protection from civil liability, 
and section 230(d), which requires interactive computer service providers to notify customers of 
commercially available parental control protections.  As the court in Cohen recognized, the 
immunities in section 230(c) “were adopted specifically for the purpose of clarifying—and 
curtailing—the scope of internet-providing defendants’ exposure to liability predicated on third 
party content, and much of the surrounding statutory language emphasizes and supports this 
focus.”  2017 WL 2192621, at *14; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (“Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum. . 
. . Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route 
of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially 
injurious messages.”).  In other words, the immunities in section 230(c) are far from tangential; 
they are one of the means by which Congress “sought to further First Amendment and e-
commerce interests on the Internet while also promoting the protection of minors.”  Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1028.   
Given section 230’s focus on limiting civil liability, the location of the conduct relevant to 
that focus “must be where redress is sought and immunity is needed,” Cohen, 2017 WL 2192621, 
at *15, i.e., through this litigation, which is in this district.  Accordingly, the court rejects 
Plaintiffs’ claim that Google may not invoke section 230(c)(1)’s immunity on the ground that it 
requires extraterritorial application of the statute.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Plaintiffs also argue in a footnote that their ATA claims are not subject to section 230(c)(1) 
because of 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), which states that “[n]othing in [section 230] shall be construed 
to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute.”  Opp’n 18 n.8.  Plaintiffs make 
a convoluted argument that Congress intended the ATA to provide a private means of enforcing 
federal criminal antiterrorism statutes, and thus the terms of the CDA exempt its application to 
ATA claims.  In other words, Plaintiffs appear to contend that the ATA’s civil suit provision is 
part of the “enforcement” of a federal criminal statute, and thus falls outside section 230(c)(1)’s 
protections, in accordance with section 230(e)(1).  This argument has been considered and rejected 
by other courts.  For example, in Jane Doe 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 
2016), the First Circuit held that “[t]he plain-language reading of section 230(e)(1)’s reference to 
‘the enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute’ dictates a meaning opposite to that 
ascribed by the appellants: such a reading excludes civil suits.”  See also Cohen, 2017 WL 
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The court now turns to the question of whether section 230(c)(1) immunity applies to 
Plaintiffs’ claims. 
D. Immunity Under Section 230(c)(1) 
Google argues that section 230(c)(1) blocks all of Plaintiffs’ claims.  As noted, section 
230(c)(1) protects from liability “(a) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (b) that 
the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information provided by another 
information content provider.”  Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 969.  Google argues that this test is 
satisfied here, because Google is a provider of interactive computer services, Plaintiffs’ claims 
seek to treat Google as a publisher, and the content at issue—ISIS videos—was provided by third 
parties.   
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Google is an interactive computer service provider.  However, 
they argue that the second and third elements of section 230(c)(1) immunity are not met, because 
they do not seek to treat Google as a publisher or speaker, and the information at issue was 
provided by Google rather than another information content provider.   
1. Whether Plaintiffs Seek to Treat Google as a Publisher or Speaker  
Google argues that it is entitled to section 230(c)(1) immunity because Plaintiffs’ claims 
seek to hold Google liable as the “publisher or speaker” of ISIS’s YouTube videos.  Plaintiffs 
counter that their lawsuit does not depend on the characterization of Google as the publisher or 
speaker of ISIS’s content, because their claims focus on Google’s violations of the ATA and 
federal criminal statutes that bar the provision of material support to terrorists.  Opp’n 18.   
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that in examining whether section 230(c) immunity 
applies to a particular claim, “what matters is not the name of the cause of action—defamation 
versus negligence versus intentional infliction of emotional distress—what matters is whether the 
cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of 
content provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02.  While “the cause of action most 
                                                                                                                                                                
2192621, at *12 n.11 (concluding that section 230(e)(1) “does not limit Section 230(c)(1) 
immunity in civil actions based on criminal statutes but rather extends only to criminal 
prosecutions,” collecting cases). 
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frequently associated with the cases on section 230 is defamation, . . . the language of the statute 
does not limit its application to defamation cases.”  Id. at 1101 (citations omitted).  “[C]ourts must 
ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s 
status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’  If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”  Id. 
at 1102.  “This guidance emphasizes that Section 230(c)(1) is implicated not only by claims that 
explicitly point to third party content but also by claims which, though artfully pleaded to avoid 
direct reference, implicitly require recourse to that content to establish liability or implicate a 
defendant’s role, broadly defined, in publishing or excluding third party [c]ommunications.”  
Cohen, 2017 WL 2192621, at *11 (discussing FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 175 
(2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102)). 
Here, the SAC alleges that Google “knowingly provided” ISIS with access to YouTube, 
allowing it to use the platform and services “as a powerful tool for terrorism” by permitting it to 
post videos to spread propaganda, recruit followers, and plan and carry out attacks.  SAC ¶¶ 12, 
13, 21.  Plaintiffs further allege that Google “refuse[d] to actively identify ISIS YouTube 
accounts” or to make “substantial or sustained efforts to ensure that ISIS would not re-establish 
the accounts using new identifiers.”  Id. at ¶¶ 20, 427, 429.  According to Google, Plaintiffs’ 
theory is that “Google permitted third parties to publish harmful material on its service and failed 
to do enough to remove that content and the users responsible for posting it.”  Mot. 12.  This 
theory, Google argues, targets its “‘traditional editorial functions’—decisions regarding ‘whether 
to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.’”  Mot. 12 (quoting Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2014)).  Google contends that these functions are 
“precisely the kind of activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of 
section 230.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171-72 (“any activity that can be boiled down to deciding 
whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 
230.”); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes 
liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material”). 
In response, Plaintiffs deny that their claims are dependent upon content posted by ISIS or 
its operatives.  They argue that their claims are based upon the fact that Google provides ISIS 
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followers with access to powerful tools and equipment to publish their own content.  These tools 
include expert assistance, communications equipment, and personnel.  Opp’n 18.  Plaintiffs assert 
that they challenge Google’s provision of the means for ISIS followers to self-publish content, 
rather than challenging the actual content itself.   
This argument essentially tries to divorce ISIS’s offensive content from the ability to post 
such content.  However, Plaintiffs’ parsing of means and content is utterly inconsistent with their 
allegations in the SAC.  Plaintiffs do not allege that they have been harmed by the mere provision 
of the YouTube platform to ISIS.  Instead, they allege that “ISIS uses YouTube as a tool and a 
weapon of terrorism,” and that ISIS recruits, plans, incites, instructs, threatens, and communicates 
its terror message on YouTube.  SAC ¶¶ 148, 150.  The SAC is replete with detailed descriptions 
of the actual content that ISIS has posted on YouTube in furtherance of its terrorist activity, 
including over 15 pages of allegations of “ISIS’s extensive use of Google’s services” to 
disseminate its terrorist message.  SAC 23-40.  In this way, Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably 
bound up with the content of ISIS’s postings, since their allegations describe a theory of liability 
based on the “essential” role that YouTube has played “in the rise of ISIS to become the most 
feared terrorist organization in the world.”  Id. at ¶¶ 139, 238 (“Google’s Services have played an 
essential role in enabling ISIS to grow, develop, and project itself as the most feared terrorist 
organization in the world.”).   
Moreover, like the plaintiffs in Cohen, Plaintiffs “rely on content to establish causation,” 
thus undercutting their argument that their claims do not seek to treat Google as a publisher of 
information.  See Cohen, 2017 WL 2192621, at *13.  Plaintiffs’ claims are not premised solely on 
the theory that Google provided a publishing or communication platform to ISIS; they are further 
grounded in the allegation that Google failed to prevent ISIS from using YouTube to transmit its 
hateful message, which resulted in great harm.  See SAC at ¶¶ 139, 147, 245 (“YouTube enables 
ISIS to communicate its messages directly to intended audiences”; YouTube enabled ISIS “to 
facilitate and accomplish” the Paris attacks).  As the Cohen court observed, Google’s “role in 
publishing that content is thus an essential causal element” of Plaintiffs’ claims, and “allowing 
liability to be imposed on that basis would ‘inherently require[] the court to treat the defendant as 
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the publisher or speaker of content provided by’” ISIS.  2017 WL 2192621, at *13.  If the court 
were to apply Plaintiffs’ logic and ignore the content of any ISIS-related YouTube postings in 
construing Plaintiffs' claims, it would be impossible to discern a causal basis for Google’s alleged 
responsibility for the terrorist attacks.   
Plaintiffs’ “means rather than content” argument is nearly identical to the one advanced in 
Fields, where the plaintiffs asserted that their claims were not based on the contents of tweets or 
the failure to remove tweets, but were instead based on “Twitter’s ‘provision of Twitter accounts 
to ISIS in the first place.’”  200 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Fields v. Twitter, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120 
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Fields II”).  The Fields court rejected this argument, holding that “providing 
accounts to ISIS is publishing activity, just like monitoring, reviewing, and editing content.”  
Fields II, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1123.  It noted that “[a] policy that selectively prohibits ISIS 
members from opening accounts would necessarily be content based as Twitter could not possibly 
identify ISIS members without analyzing some speech, idea or content expressed by the would-be 
account holder: i.e., ‘I am associated with ISIS.’”  Id.  Like the plaintiffs in Fields, Plaintiffs in 
this case attempt to penalize a publishing decision by imposing liability on Google for failing to 
prevent ISIS followers from using YouTube.  The alleged wrongdoing challenged by Plaintiffs is 
“the decision to permit third parties to post content.”  Fields, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 972.  As such, 
Plaintiffs seek to treat Google as the publisher of ISIS’s video content. 
Plaintiffs offer a second argument to support their position that they are not suing Google 
in its capacity as a publisher or speaker of third party content.  This contention is based on the 
"functionality" that Google provides to YouTube users.  Plaintiffs argue that Google provides 
proprietary functions that are not “traditional publishing” activities.  These functions enhance 
ISIS’s ability to conduct operations; they include allowing accounts that are taken down to rapidly 
“reconstitute” by permitting bulk friend/follow requests, and failing to take steps to minimize or 
mitigate “incremental naming” of accounts.  Opp’n 20-21.  Plaintiffs assert that the use of these 
functions is “suspicious conduct that is easily detectable and prevented by Google.”  Id. at 21 
(emphasis in original); see also Hr’g Tr. 41.  According to Plaintiffs, placing limitations on this 
conduct is not content-specific, and therefore, does not implicate Google’s role as a publisher of 
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content. 
This argument, too, fails, because it seeks to impose liability on Google for allowing users 
to reconstitute or recreate accounts which Google has already chosen to disable.  As the Ninth 
Circuit has recognized, this is precisely the result Congress sought to avoid when it enacted 
section 230 and provided protection for websites “against the evil of liability for failure to remove 
offensive content”:  
 
Section 230 was prompted by a state court case holding Prodigy 
responsible for a libelous message posted on one of its financial 
message boards. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished). The 
court there found that Prodigy had become a “publisher” under state 
law because it voluntarily deleted some messages from its message 
boards “on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste,’” and was 
therefore legally responsible for the content of defamatory messages 
that it failed to delete. Id. at *4. The Stratton Oakmont court 
reasoned that Prodigy’s decision to perform some voluntary self-
policing made it akin to a newspaper publisher, and thus responsible 
for messages on its bulletin board that defamed third parties. The 
court distinguished Prodigy from CompuServe, which had been 
released from liability in a similar defamation case because 
CompuServe “had no opportunity to review the contents of the 
publication at issue before it was uploaded into CompuServe’s 
computer banks.” Id.; see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 
F.Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Under the reasoning of Stratton 
Oakmont, online service providers that voluntarily filter some 
messages become liable for all messages transmitted, whereas 
providers that bury their heads in the sand and ignore problematic 
posts altogether escape liability. Prodigy claimed that the “sheer 
volume” of message board postings it received—at the time, over 
60,000 a day—made manual review of every message impossible; 
thus, if it were forced to choose between taking responsibility for all 
messages and deleting no messages at all, it would have to choose 
the latter course. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *3. 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163, 1174.  The Ninth Circuit explained that in enacting section 230, 
“Congress sought to spare interactive computer services this grim choice by allowing them to 
perform some editing on user-generated content without thereby becoming liable for all 
defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn’t edit or delete.”  Id.  “In other words, 
Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation of content . . 
.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Under Plaintiffs’ theory, Google would be penalized for the act of 
policing YouTube by removing problematic or ISIS-related accounts that users are then able to 
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immediately regenerate.
6
  This “policing” falls within the purview of a publisher. 
Notably, the court in Cohen rejected a similar theory asserted by the plaintiffs, who sought 
to hold Facebook liable for “‘provision of services’ to Hamas in the form of account access 
‘coupled with Facebook’s refusal to use available resources . . . to identify and shut down Hamas 
[] accounts.’”  2017 WL 2192621, at *12.  The court held that “[w]hile superficially content-
neutral, this attempt to draw a narrow distinction between policing accounts and policing content 
must ultimately be rejected.  Facebook’s choices as to who may use its platform are inherently 
bound up in its decisions as to what may be said on its platform, and so liability imposed based on 
its failure to remove users would equally ‘derive[ ] from [Facebook’s] status or conduct as a 
‘publisher or speaker.’”  Id. (quoting LeadClick, 838 F.3d at 175).  This court agrees with the 
reasoning in Cohen.  Plaintiffs seek to hold Google liable for failing to adopt a strategy to defeat 
activity such as account reconstitution and bulk friend/follow requests; to the extent the objective 
of such a strategy is to control who can publish content, section 230(c)(1) immunizes Google’s 
decision not to adopt that strategy.  The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “any activity that can be 
boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is 
perforce immune under section 230.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71; see also Doe v. MySpace, 
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (“decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and 
deletion of content . . . [are] actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.” (quotation 
omitted)).  
For the reasons above, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims seek to treat Google as 
the publisher or speaker of ISIS’s YouTube videos.   
2. Whether Google Is an Information Content Provider 
Finally, Google argues that it is not an “information content provider” because third parties 
created and posted the offending content at issue on YouTube, and not Google.  The CDA defines 
                                                 
6
 This argument also appears to implicate the specific immunity afforded by section 230(c)(2), 
which provides in relevant part that interactive computer service providers and users shall not be 
held liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable . . .”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
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“information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for 
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  While a website operator like Google can be both an 
“interactive computer service” and an “information content provider,” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 
1162, “[t]he critical issue is whether . . . [the interactive computer service] acts as an information 
content provider with respect to the information” at issue.  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 
F.3d 1119, 1125 (quotation omitted).   
Plaintiffs argue that Google acts as an “information content provider” by placing targeted 
ads.  According to Plaintiffs, Google selects an ad to be displayed alongside user content based on 
information it gathers about the viewer and the posting, thus creating “new unique content” in the 
form of a composite page for specific viewers.  FAC ¶¶ 460-461.  This specifically-created content 
is intended “to capture [a viewer’s] attention” and keep the viewer on the page longer.  Hr’g Tr. 
58.  In this way, Plaintiffs assert, Google’s conduct exceeds the scope of immunity provided by 
section 230(c)(1), because Google thereby “enters into the unprotected world of content creators.”  
Opp’n 23. 
This theory finds no support in the case law.  In Roommates, which is controlling Ninth 
Circuit authority, the court interpreted the term “development” as used in the section 230(f)(3) 
definition of “information content provider” “as referring not merely to augmenting the content 
generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.”  521 F.3d at 1167-68.  “In 
other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to 
section 230 [immunity], if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”  Id. at 
1168.  In Jones, 755 F.3d at 410, the Sixth Circuit adopted the definition of “development” from 
Roommates and held that “[a] material contribution to the alleged illegality of the content does not 
mean merely taking action that is necessary to the display of allegedly illegal content.  Rather, it 
means being responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly unlawful.”   
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Google “materially contribut[ed]” in any way to the 
actual content of ISIS’s YouTube videos.  They do not claim that Google’s ads (which are 
themselves third-party content) are objectionable, or that the ads played any role in making ISIS’s 
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terrorist videos unlawful.  For example, Plaintiffs do not allege that any ads paired with ISIS-
related content offered tools or instructions on how to carry out ISIS’s threats, or otherwise 
encouraged individuals to commit acts of terrorism.  The SAC contains only one screenshot 
example of an alleged targeted ad next to an ISIS video on YouTube; the screenshot shows an  
advertisement for a product called “ThreatMetrix Cybercrime Report: Q4 2015.”  SAC ¶ 458.  
Plaintiffs do not make any allegations about the relationship between this product and terrorism.  
See, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 416-17 (holding interactive service provider was not information 
content provider as to allegedly defamatory third party posts; even though provider appended his 
own comments to the posts, the plaintiff did not allege that the provider’s comments were 
themselves defamatory).   
Nor do Plaintiffs suggest that Google’s targeted ad algorithm is anything but content 
neutral.  Notably, the court in Roommates distinguished between a website that merely provides 
“neutral tools” that may be used by third parties to post unlawful content, and a website that “both 
elicits the allegedly illegal content and makes aggressive use of it in conducting its business.”  521 
F.3d at 1171-72.  The court held that a search engine’s provision of “neutral tools to carry out 
what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to ‘development’ for purposes of the 
immunity exception.”  Id. at 1169.  So too here.  Google’s provision of neutral tools, including 
targeted advertising, does not equate to content development under section 230, because as 
currently alleged, the tools do not encourage the posting of unlawful or objectionable material.  
See id. at 1171-72.   
At the hearing, Plaintiffs suggested for the first time that the Roommates “material 
contribution” test does not apply because the Roommates court was not considering the exact 
question presented here, which is whether targeted advertising is a form of content development.  
Hr’g Tr. 59-60.  Plaintiffs assert that the issue of “strategically combining third party content” 
presents a matter of first impression, and that “precedent supports a conclusion that Google’s 
actions [in targeting ads] overstep traditional editorial and publishing functions.”  Opp’n 23.  In 
support, Plaintiffs cite MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 
2004 WL 833595 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004).  However, the facts of that case bear little 
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resemblance to Google’s alleged actions here.  In MCW, the website at issue was a consumer 
complaint forum.  The defendants, one of which operated the website, did not dispute that they 
“themselves create[d], develop[ed], and post[ed] original, defamatory information” regarding the 
plaintiff, nor did they dispute that they “personally [wrote] and create[d] numerous disparaging 
and defamatory messages about [the plaintiff] in the form of report titles and various headings,” 
such as “Con Artists,” “Scam,” “Ripoff,” and “Corrupt Companies.”  Id. at *9, n.11.  Additionally, 
the defendants actively encouraged a consumer to take certain photos depicting the plaintiff’s 
company name so that they could be included on the website.  Id. at *10.  Based on these facts, the 
court concluded that the defendant website had acted as an “information content provider” with 
respect to some of the defamatory information on their site and could not claim § 230(c)(1) 
immunity.  Id.  In contrast with the defendant in MCW, Plaintiffs do not allege that Google created 
any content that was itself objectionable or unlawful. 
Plaintiffs provide no support for their position that Roommates does not apply here.  The 
rule announced in Roommates, that a website operator is responsible for creating or developing 
content within the meaning of section 230(f)(3) if it “materially contribut[es] to [the content’s] 
alleged unlawfulness,” 521 F.3d at 1167-68, was not limited to the facts of that case.  Courts have 
applied the material contribution test in various factual scenarios.  For example, the Sixth Circuit’s 
2014 decision in Jones is instructive.  In Jones, the court adopted and applied the Roommates test 
to determine whether the operator of an interactive service provider was a content developer under 
section 230(f)(3) where he selected allegedly defamatory statements for online publication, 
appended commentary to the postings, and refused to remove them upon request.  755 F.3d at 415-
16.  The court observed that the “crucial distinction” for determining what constitutes 
“development” in section 230(f)(3) is “on the one hand, taking actions (traditional to publishers) 
that are necessary to the display of unwelcome and actionable content and, on the other hand, 
responsibility for what makes the displayed content illegal or actionable.”  Id. at 414.  It concluded 
that the defendant was an information content provider as to his own comments, but that his 
comments, which were not themselves challenged as defamatory, did not materially contribute to 
the defamatory content of the challenged statements.  Id. at 416-17.  It also noted that the 
Case 4:16-cv-03282-DMR   Document 110   Filed 10/23/17   Page 24 of 27
 25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
defendant’s provision of neutral tools for third parties to use to submit information did not 
constitute a material contribution to any defamatory speech that had been uploaded by third 
parties.  Id. at 416; see also id. at 412-13 (discussing cases adopting and applying material 
contribution test).  As with the interactive service provider’s own commentary in Jones, Plaintiffs 
do not allege that Google’s own actions—here, its targeted ad algorithm—contribute in any way to 
what makes the ISIS-related videos unlawful or objectionable.  Google’s ad pairings do nothing to 
enhance the unlawfulness of ISIS videos, encourage the posting of ISIS videos, or make posting 
ISIS videos easier.  See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1172 (discussing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124).   
  Plaintiffs also argue that by sharing advertising revenue with ISIS, Google is directly 
contributing to ISIS’s unlawful activities.  Opp’n 24.  Their argument on this point appears to be 
that by “paying ISIS” for its videos, Google is responsible for developing and generating ISIS 
content.  See id.  The case that Plaintiffs cite in support is distinguishable.  In FTC v. Accusearch, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009), the FTC sued a website operator that sold personal 
data online, including telephone records which are protected from disclosure under federal law.  
Id. at 1190.  The defendant asserted section 230(c)(1) immunity, stressing that its search services 
were provided by third-party researchers.  Id. at 1191.  The court held that the defendant was not 
entitled to immunity because it was an information content provider.  The court noted that the 
defendant “solicited requests for . . . confidential information and then paid researchers to obtain 
it” with the knowledge that “its researchers were obtaining the information through fraud or other 
illegality.”  Id. at 1199.  Based on these actions, the court held that the defendant “contributed 
mightily to the unlawful conduct of its researchers,” and that “the offensive postings were [the 
defendant’s] raison d’etre and it affirmatively solicited them.”  Id. at 1200.  It concluded that 
“[t]he offending content was the disclosed confidential information itself,” and that the defendant 
“was responsible for the development of that content—for the conversion of the legally protected 
records from confidential material to publicly exposed information.”  Id. at 1199.  Unlike the 
defendant in Accusearch, the SAC does not contain any allegations that Google was responsible 
for the development of the content of offending ISIS videos or that it actively solicited terrorist 
videos.  Indeed, one court has held that interactive computer service providers are eligible for 
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section 230(c)(1) immunity “even where the interactive service provider has an active, even 
aggressive role in making available content prepared by others,” including paying users for 
content.  See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Roommates, 521 
F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (“the CDA does not withhold immunity for the 
encouragement or solicitation of information,” citing Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52).  Therefore, 
even accepting as true Plaintiffs’ allegations that Google shares ad revenue with ISIS, such 
conduct does not mean that Google is a content developer with respect to ISIS videos. 
At the hearing, Plaintiffs also asserted that the allegation that Google shared ad revenue 
with members of ISIS does not implicate the content of YouTube postings or Google’s role as a 
publisher in any way, since revenue sharing with ISIS is itself the provision of material support.  
Hr’g Tr. 72 (“you can’t share money with a terrorist.”).  However, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to 
proceed on this theory, it is not pleaded in the SAC.  Although the SAC highlights one example of 
Google placing a targeted ad with an ISIS video on YouTube, there is no allegation that any 
revenue was actually shared with the user who posted the video.  See SAC ¶ 458.  There is also no 
allegation that the user who uploaded the video is a member of ISIS, and no allegations connecting 
alleged revenue sharing with the Paris attacks.   
Section 230(c)(1) “precludes treatment as a publisher or speaker for ‘any information 
provided by another information content provider.’”  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).  “The critical issue is whether . . . [the interactive 
computer service] acts as an information content provider with respect to the information” at issue.  
Id. (quotation omitted).  Here, the SAC does not allege that Google acted as an “information 
content provider” with respect to the information at issue, i.e., the offending ISIS videos.  
Accordingly, Google satisfies the third element of section 230(c)(1) immunity.  Plaintiffs’ claims 
fall within the scope of section 230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity and are therefore barred.7   
It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to grant leave to amend a complaint 
in the absence of an “apparent” reason, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, 
                                                 
7
 Because the court concludes that section 230(c)(1) bars Plaintiffs’ claims, it does not reach the 
parties’ arguments about the sufficiency of the claims pleaded in the SAC. 
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prejudice to the opposing party, futility of the amendments, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies 
in the complaint by prior amendment.  Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999).  Accordingly, the SAC is 
dismissed with leave to amend. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Google’s motion to dismiss is granted in part.  Plaintiffs’ SAC 
is dismissed with leave to amend.  Any amended complaint shall be filed within 14 days of the 
date of this order. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: October 23, 2017 
 ______________________________________ 
 Donna M. Ryu 
 United States Magistrate Judge 
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